Reading notes for Fredrik
Barth:
Political Leadership among
Swat Pathans
Fredrik Barth is a Norwegian scholar, whose life and career has
taken him throughout the world. He was born in Germany and his early
education was in Norway. After receiving an M.A. at the University
of Chicago in 1949, he began doctoral studies at the London School of Economics
under Edmund Leach. He did fieldwork in Swat from February to
November, 1954, with funding from the Royal Norwegian Research
Council. While Barth was in the field, his advisor Leach was
appointed to a lectureship at Cambridge University. Barth followed
him there, where he completed his doctoral thesis, "The Political
Organization of Swat Pathans" in 1957. He indicates that this
monograph, published in 1959, is "essentially identical" to the
dissertation. [For details on Barth's subsequent career, see
Ahmed Afzil's project site.]
The Swat Valley is a narrow, lush agricultural valley in the
western extension of the Himalayas, in the Northwest Frontier District of
Pakistan, bordering on Afghanistan. At the time of Barth’s study in
the early 1950s, its densely-settled population was Islamic, although it was
sufficiently Hinduized that caste was a salient principle (at least
as a secular hierarchy of occupations). Controlling the land and
Valley politics were the Pakhtuns, comprising about 20% of the total
population. They were warriors and administrators, and all
non-Pakhtuns, except the Saints, were clients and working tenants of the
Pakhtuns. The Pakhtun chiefs collected rents of 3/4 to 4/5 of tenant
harvest, which they used [in the absence of a commercial market for grain] in
hospitality, gifting, and lending The Saints were a complementary elite, basing
their status on Islamic virtues of piety, learning, and sanctity.
Like The Nuer, this monograph is a study of politics
in a zone of anarchy and acephalous structure, a "land of freedom and
rebellion" (133). Here it was arable land, not cattle,
that was sought and contested. Barth, too, found a social
structure of segmentary branching and balanced oppositions. However,
his view of politics was diametrically opposed to E-P's. He opens
with R-B's famous definition of the political system in African
Political Systems, but his own formulation followed Isaac Schapera's
critique that emphasized leadership as the basis of politics. Barth
is interested in choice and decision-making in the formation, actions, and
changes of hierarchical groups of a leader and followers in a shifting field of
similar groups. Leadership and followership must be constantly performed,
and enacted. Thus, as David Jacobson observes, E-P formed his Nuer monograph
around chapters on the structural planes of Nuer "politics," but
Barth's book is framed by chapters on leaders, followers, and alliances.
In a sense, Barth is still concerned with the longstanding British
anthropological theme of social order and how it is insured,
like Gluckman and E-P and others. He puts it more directly as a
matter of personal security—how a Valley resident can secure for himself and
his family a house, land, and the support of others. But for Barth,
this order is not to be sought in the normative structure of society but in the
strategic patterns of interaction. His interest is not in structural
imperatives, nor in structural contradictions but in human
intention. He does not look for systemic function but
for personal gain.
Expository logic of the book
Barth announces that “the main purpose of the present study is to
give a descriptive analysis of the political system of Swat, with special
reference to the sources of political authority, and the form of organization
within which this authority is exercised” (1). After introductory
(1) and background (2) chapters, Barth lays out the “component parts” of the
political system (chapters 3-6), then shows how these bases of authority
combine to define the position and followings of the chiefs (chapter 7) and the
saints (chapter 8). Then he moves to the “second main step in the
synthesis”—that of showing “how combinations and oppositions of these
smaller groups create the actual political organization of the valley.” This
is subject of chapter 9, the longest of the chapters. This is
followed by an account (in chapter 10) of the emergence of a “native state” in
Swat between 1917 and 1926 “within the pre-existing framework” and of how the
state continues to rely upon that framework. The book concludes with
a brief statement of the complementary nature of chiefly and Saint political
leadership.
1: Introduction
Barth’s starting point is skepticism about R-B’s definition of a
political system as “the maintenance or establishment of social order,
within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority
through the use, or possibility of use, of physical force” (APS
1940:xiv). Barth accepts Schapera’s criticism of this:
“In studying political organization… we have to study, in fact,
the whole system of communal leadership and all the functions (as well as the
powers) of the leaders; and in this context such activities as the organization
or religious ceremonies or collective hunts, or the concentration and
redistribution of wealth, are as relevant as the administration of justice and
similarly significant for comparative purposes” (1956:218-219)
Barth identifies three "underlying frames of organization"
(that he elaborates in chapter 3), and which he likens to the social structure
of Raymond Firth’s distinction. This formal social structure
of Swat society was not unlike the Nuer, with segmentary lineages overlaying
political locality relations. But to him of greater importance was
an informal political structure of (1) dyadic contractual ties
between a single khan leader and his followers and (2) a kind
of balance of power, a violent equilibrium, among the khan. Politics
was thus the maneuvering for advantage, "the art of manipulating these
various dyadic relations so as to create effective and viable bodies of
supporters" (p. 4). That in turn required constantly making
and reassessing choices, and shifting coalitions.
There had already been a state authority in the valley since the
1920s, the Wali of Swat. Barth insisted that the Wali had to rely on
traditional leadership patterns, although later (65) it turns out that thirty
years before he ordered permanent land ownership (that is, no wesh
redistribution)
2: General Ecology and Ethnology of Swat
Swat is a 120-mile-long valley setting. The 400,000
densely-settled residents of the Swat valley are a group of
Pashto-speaking Yusufzai Pathans. There is intensive grain
cultivation through capital-intensive artificial and natural irrigation. Land
is valuable and is held in common by a lineage; each male adult has claim to a
share of lineage land, which is subject to periodic reallotment (wesh). Leadership
is secured by land ownership but depends on lavish hospitality and reckless
spending to hold a clientele.
3: Underlying Frameworks of Organization
Barth here returns to detail the three "underlying frames of
organization" that he introduced in the introduction
1. spatial/territorial: locality = Swat »» regions (13
@ 20-30,000) »» "local areas" »» village groups »» villages (@
500-10,000) »» wards (@ 200-500, @ unit of admin and mosque) »» houses (@ 40-80
of economically-independent elementary families)
A village will thus have a diverse group of persons: Pakhtuns and
their tenants, other rival Pakhtuns and their tenants, Saints and their tenants
and dependents. In each ward will be at least one men's house, the
social, recreational, and political center
2. castes (Qoum): roughly ten major
patrilineal, hereditary, ranked occupational groups, conceptually endogamous,
but without religious importance and not forming localized communities
3. patrilineal descent groups (khel):
segmentary but not corporate (23-30). Although this is strictly true
for only the 1/5 of valley residents who are Pakhtuns, their clients are
aligned with their leader’s genealogy
4: Neighborhood, Marriage and Affinity
The above three frameworks are more or less ascriptive, but there were
also another set of relations that were achieved—those of neighborhood and
association and marriage and kinship. The former are organized
mainly through local associations for life-cycle rituals, and the latter by
marriage contract.
Barth details in the chapter the teletole associations
(all permanent residents of a ward who associate for Moslem life-cycle
rituals—e.g., circumcision, marriage, funerals—providing mutual assistance) and
marriage contracts and rituals.
5: Relations of Inequality and Authority
Barth turns here to the overtly “political” groups with more
overtly political character, which also differ from above in being internally
hierarchical and based on dyadic contractual relations with a leader.
(a) economic contracts—six main types, including
land tenancy and agriculturalists and craft specialists
(b) house tenancy contracts—i.e., landowners own
houses in proportion to their land, so most villagers must rent
(c) the men’s house—which serves as a meeting
house and dorm
(d) Saints and their followers—Saints are not leaders
of men’s houses, but their followership is a structural
equivalent. Saints are expected to use their religious standing to
keep/make peace, and for that they are given land by Pakhtuns.
The following chapter finishes setting the scene by describing the
organization of local communities, and the subsequent chapters show how the
leaders of these contractual groups manipulate their positions to build
followings.
6: Land Tenure and Political
Relations Within Local Communities
This chapter, in effect, shows how the above principles of
organization interconnect in a local framework, fundamentally tied by
land. See 65-67 for details of the wesh system,
whose administrative machinery was the jirga or village
assembly, right to speak in which was held by the landowners. It is
this chapter in which Barth really begins to describe political dynamics.
69: ‘within such a framework of ideas, let us adopt, for a moment,
the point of view of the non-landowners.” He then analyzes their
“choices” within constraints.
7: Authority and Following of Chiefs
The potential authority of chiefs derives predominantly from
control of land. “Though land they gain control over house tenants,
occupational contract holders and land tenants, and other dependents; while
from it they reap the profits which enable them to enlarge their followings by
giving feasts and gifts in their men’s houses. Furthermore, chiefs
gain authority by defending their honor, particularly through blood revenge;
but this activity is largely a personal matter and falls outside the field of
alliance” (108)
The valley is divided into the “satisfied men” and the “hungry
men.” This is the context for the significance of hospitality and
gifts. A chief will give away hundreds of times the income necessary
for his own family subsistence.
Generosity must be complemented by a leader’s reputation for
bravado and impetuousness and a sense of honor and a willingness to
revenge. One speaks in the jirga for oneself but
also for clients; thus, it is a political forum for demonstrating power and
influence. There was a strong value on personal honor, on defense of
one's interests, impetuous bravery. Feuds in defense of honor both
require a following and give one the reputation to attract a following--for
whom a khan leader can offer security, hospitality (men's
house), and land. Khan assemble clienteles of
cultivator-tenants and craft specialists. These khan,
however, must necessarily compete with one another for followings and for
land--thus there is some room for leverage for non-Pakhtun. Thus,
these ties are more contractual than merely dominant/submissive; they are that
too, but Barth's point is that everyone is trying to maximize.
89-91: “the general form of a chief’s following”: see
this description
8: Authority and Following of Saints
He notes there are a great variety of Saints, ranging from
recluses to minor landowners to headmen and rulers of
villagers. "A majority of saints live as minor landowners in
villages dominated by chiefs" (95) Yet the category has very definite
social meanings, and “the main sources of political influence and authority of
Saints are their control of land, their role as mediators and their reputation
for morality and holiness” (92).
A control of land (92-96): In
Cyrenaica, the Sanusi were given land along the borders, in a sense “outside”
the structure; in Swat, the Saints instead are given the inferior land and the
more difficult-to-control villages
B their role as mediator or arbitrator (96-99)
C their reputation for holiness and piety (99-102)
102-103: “the general form of a saint’s
following”: Barth describes this as a series of concentric circles,
beginning with his close agnatic kin and dependents
(land); then wider circles of the territory through which they are
spread and his role as mediator is effective; out to the farther reaches of his
reputation for holiness.
9: Alliances and Political Blocs
Note the logic of the book above. In that sense, this
chapter, the longest in the book, is really its central chapter, the “second
main step in the synthesis”: “that of showing how the combination or opposition
of these smaller groups creates the actual political organization of the
valley. This requires a description of the kinds of relationship
which imply mutual political support, and, conversely, the kinds of structural
situation that imply opposition between leaders” (104).
That is, the elemental unit is a leader and his followers (which
is a “politically corporate group”), and “the striking feature of the political
organization of Swat is the emphasis on free choice and
contract.” However, such units do not exist by themselves, but
rather in combination; in fact, they tend to be “aligned in two
grand dispersed political divisions or blocs” (a gloss for dela suggested
to him by Martin Southwold), which is itself the result of a series of
alliances among local leaders, who consider themselves equals (unlike the blocs
that are relations of leader-followers) of mutual assistance and strategic
advantage.
An alliance is a mutual support contract between two leaders;
while Swat is acephalous and segmentary, there is none of the branching fusion
and fission that E-P describes for the Nuer; these alliances are fixed and
relatively permanent. What develops then is a “two-party system” up
and down the valley (106), although at the end of the book he claims that he
has not been able to treat adequately the reasons why no more than two blocs
develop (134).
108-109: discusses which categories of persons are apt to be
rivals and which make typical allies.[Sharpest lines of cleavage are between
close patrilineal kin; agnates are more often rivals and enemies than allies.]
115-118: on the hierarchy of public assemblies, which are the
major forums for the wider blocs, including an actual case (117-118, which
Jacobson also discusses) alliances are made betweenPakhtuns .
Barth goes on to consider the use of force and concludes with a
section on “the position of leaders in the blocs” (124-126). That
is, the bloc is a political alliance of more-or-less equals; centralized
control requires clientage, and thus structurally the blocs do not yield to a
centralized Khanate.
10: History and Organization of Swat
State
A “native state” emerged between 1917 and 1926 within the
pre-existing framework and using (and continuing to use) this pre-existing
structure of political leadership. Its ruler, an ex-"Saint" now with
the title of the Wali, now controls the upper 2/3s of the valley; he is
recognized by the British and treated roughly as the rajahs of British
India. Barth sees this as an unusual development, still vulnerable
and tentative.
129-132: Barth describes the formal organization of the
Swat State and its three constituent units of administration, army, and
taxation
11: Conclusion
In the brief, three-page conclusion, Barth turns to the two
contrasting styles of leadership offered by the chiefs and the Saints, in which
"pride, rivalry, and virility" are bases of chiefly reputation and
admiration, and “moderation, reasonableness, and meekness” are authoritative
qualities of Saints. This leads, though, to a
complementarity. The followings of chiefs and Saints tend to
cross-cut one another, but the two opposed blocs contain both kinds of leaders.
Barth closes by reiterating how different this pattern of
persisting opposed blocs of chiefs and their followers is to the
situational fissioning and fusing on multiple levels in other segmentary systems
like the Nuer (whom he doesn’t cite here nor take up elsewhere in any detail).
Further Thoughts: On Nuer and Swat
Feuding
Swat politics is the often violent, ever-tense competition among
and within factional blocs. "Honor" and "shame"
are the culturally marked values of reputation. Revenge is required
of any challenges to honor, and revenge requires a response equal or greater to
the rebuke. Thus, there is a constant tendency toward escalation. Serious
challenges require blood revenge and blood revenge carried out begins a feud.
This raises the question of the similarities and differences
between Nuer feuding and Swat feuding, or at least between E-P’s account and
Barth’s. To E-P, the feud is a means of maintaining equilibrium
between local communities:
"the blood-feud may be viewed as a structural movement
between political segments by which the form of the Nuer political system, as
we know it, is maintained... The function of the feud... is therefore, to
maintain the structural equilibrium between opposed tribal segments which are,
nevertheless, politically fused in relation to larger units." (158-159)
David Jacobson notes about Barth that he "argues that a feud
occurs not only as a defense of honor but also as a strategy of leadership. He
indicates tactics by which chiefs, through feuding, may enhance their prestige
and attract followers. It could be read as handbook of
leadership stratagems for Swat Pathans, a manual on how to score points in the
game of Pathan politics....These rules represent Barth's understanding of the
working system; they are organizational, not normative, principles"
(Jacobson 88). [Perhaps if E-P had taken Barth's line of
explanation, he would have focused more on the "bulls."]
Still, there are other 'rules of the game' that serve as rational
checks that contain conflict and preserve a kind of dynamic equilibrium among
the blocs, including:
· as blocs grow
larger, internal rivalries grow and sections hive off.
· winners don't want to
take in too many "absconders" from losing side
· individual khan try
to increase land holdings »»» use of violence »»» killings »»» revenge »»»
growing number of enemies ("There is an upper limit to every chief's
aggressiveness, since he must always keep the number of his enemies lower than
the total force of his following" (1959)
· the Saints as
intermediaries (like the leopard-skin priests of Nuer): they are, in a sense,
inverse khan
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